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Two highway bridge approaches, about 10 and 12 m in height, near Calcutta, India constructed with mechanically stabilized earth 
failed recently.  These embankments were founded on soft and compressible, fine-grained soils of the intertidal flats and backswamps 
of the Ganges delta.  One of these embankments, which failed in the final stages of its construction, was constructed after foundation 
soils were strengthened with preloading and prefabricated vertical drain installation and the other second embankment that failed 
within a month of its opening for traffic was constructed on unimproved ground.  Fortunately, direct collateral damage from these 
incidents was small.  Available geotechnical data indicated that design inadequacy was the main cause of these failures.  Using pre- 
and post- consolidation shear strengths the embankments were redesigned.  Reconstruction involved PVD installation at the second 
site and construction of stabilizing berms at both locations.  The facilities are now operational and appear to be performing 





Two highway embankments constructed with mechanically 
stabilized earth failed recently near Kolkata (Calcutta) of 
southern part of West Bengal state, India (Fig. 1).  The sites 
are located within the intertidal flats and backswamps of the 
Hooghly, a major distributary of the Ganges (Fig. 2).  One of 
these sites, KM 18 site, remain waterlogged throughout the 
year, and the other, KM 26 site, also remains waterlogged over 
prolonged periods.  Both the embankments were retained by 
mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls constructed with 
compacted river sand reinforced with galvanized steel 
reinforcements. 
 
Essential details of the incidents are presented first followed 
by outlines of the subsurface investigation and monitoring 
programs, the inference from these programs, redesign of the 
earth structures, remedial measures incorporated and 
subsequent reconstruction work are presented later. 
 
Fig.1. Failures at KM 26 and KM 18site. 
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Fig. 2. Geological and geomorphological setting.
INCIDENTS 
 
KM 26 Failure 
 
The first event affected a highway interchange structure, under 
construction since July 15, 2003.  The structure is retained by 
a Mechanically Stabilized Earth wall along the outer shoulder 
and with the fill slope of 2 (H):1(V) along the inner shoulder.  
The nearly-complete MSE wall underwent a deep seated 
failure in the early hours of rains received and an additional 
0.4 mm of rainfall on the following day.  The height of the 
affected embankment was between 8.9 and 9.8 m at the time 
of the incident.  The cross section of the failed MSE wall is 
shown on Fig. 3.  Post failure inspection indicated that the 
MSE wall failed due to external instability without significant 
internal distress. 
KM 18 Failure 
 
The second incident involved an MSE wall that runs along the 
western edge of the northbound lanes of a highway 
approaching a railway overpass.  A 30-year old, 9-m high 
earth embankment with 3H to 1V side-slope along the eastern 
edge of the approach carries the southbound traffic.  The 
failure occurred immediately after midnight on February 9, 
2006 about a month after the highway was opened for 
vehicular traffic.  During the failure, a section of the newly 
constructed 2-lane approach vertically settled by about 3 m 
and laterally translated outward by about 1 m.  The cross 
section of the failed MSE wall is shown on Fig. 4.  As at KM 
26 site, the MSE wall at KM 18 site appeared to have failed 
due to external instability without significant internal distress. 
 
Fig. 3. Cross section and layout: KM 26 MSE wall. 
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Fig. 4. Cross section of the KM 18 MSE wall.
The failed MSE wall was constructed for four laning of a 
pre-existing two-lane, undivided highway that runs on the 
30-year old embankment with 3(H):1(V) side slopes.  The 
construction of the old embankment also triggered several 
slope failures.  One such failure occurred in 1966, when the 
embankment reached its full height 10.7 m.  The instability 
was assessed to be due to a deep-seated circular slip that day 
lighted just beyond the toe.  During this failure, the maximum 
embankment height within the stable stretch was 6.7 m.  As 
remedial measures, the failed embankment was removed, the 
highway elevation was lowered and the embankment was 
reconstructed along with a 2.1-m high stabilizing berm along 
the edges of the embankment.  Another slope failure occurred 
later immediately to the south of the railway tracks.  Since 
poor subsurface conditions did not allow construction of an 
embankment of required height at the location of this failure, 
the earth embankment at the location of this failure was 
replaced by structural spans added to the bridge structure for 
carrying the overpass.  Details on the original geotechnical 
investigation and design of the highway in this area can be 
found in Gangopadhyay and Das (1969). 
Incidentally, in the recent constructions for four laning project, 
the north approach to the railway overpass at KM 18 site was 
of similar details as those of the failed MSE wall.  The 
subsurface conditions at the north approach site and the 
location of KM 18 failure were also comparable.  However, 
unlike the failed MSE wall, the north approach was 
constructed on ground improved by PVD installation followed 
by preloading and the MSE wall along the north approach has 
remained stable since its construction. 
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATION AND MONITERING 
KM 26 Site 
 
Pre failure subsurface investigation basically consisted of 
drilling of six boreholes for foundation design for the overpass 
structure and other boreholes were drilled in the post-failure 
investigation.  The field work in these investigations included 
conducting standard penetration tests (SPTs), extraction of 
thin-tube samples, and field vane shear testing (VST).  The 
laboratory tests included unconsolidated undrained (UU) 
triaxial and one dimensional incrementally loaded 
consolidation tests on selected thin tube samples, and tests for 
grain size distribution, natural moisture content, liquid limit 
and plastic limit. 
Subsurface investigations at KM 26 indicate that the site is 
underlain by 15-m thick, grey, silty clay of Holocene age over 
stiff, yellow-brown, stiff silty clay of Pleistocene age 
containing calcareous nodules and silt and sand interbeds.  
The top 10 m of the Holocene soil was soft and contained 
organics, and the lower 5 m of this unit was firm.  
Groundwater was within 1.0 to 1.5 m of the original ground 
surface at the time of post-failure investigation.  The soil 
samples were classified as CL according to ASTM D2487 
(ASTM 2007).  The undrained shear strength, , of KM 26 
site soils from UU tests and VSTs are plotted in Fig. 5a 
against the effective vertical stress, 
us
vσ′ .  All raw undrained 
shear strengths from VST measurements were corrected in this 
study according to Bjerrum (1974). 
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Fig. 5. Undrained shear strengths. 
One dimensional consolidation test data from KM 26 site 
indicated that at the time of failure the consolidation process 
under the stresses imposed by 6.7 m high embankment was 
complete.  This result was used for preparing Fig. 5a.  The 
sensitivity of the soil layers were between 4 and 7. 
The embankment and the MSE wall at KM 26 site were 
constructed after installing PVDs to depths between 11.5 and 
15.5 m in square grids with 1.5 m spacing.  The PVD treated 
zone covered the entire embankment footprint and extended to 
4 m outside of the MSE wall face.  To monitor the settlements 
and pore water pressure development during fill placement, 
four settlement plates S1, S2, S3 and S4 and four stand pipe 
piezometers P1, P2, P3 and P4 were installed near Station 800 
(Fig. 3).  These monitoring data indicate that the rapid 
construction rate after October 31, 2004 lead to a rapid pore 
water pressure development and accelerated settlement rate 
(Fig. 6). 
KM 18 Site 
 
The available geotechnical data at the design stage originated 
from two boreholes and all other boreholes were drilled after 
the failure.  The field work in these investigations included 
conducting standard penetration tests (SPTs), extraction of 
thin-tube samples, and field vane shear testing (VST).  The 
laboratory tests included unconsolidated undrained (UU) 
consolidation tests of selected thin tube samples, and tests for 
grain size distribution, natural moisture content, liquid limit 
and plastic limit. 
Data from these investigations indicate that the site is 
underlain by a sequence of Holocene silty clay, over stiff silty 
clay of Pleistocene age.  The upper 5 to 8 m of the Holocene 
…
 
Fig. 6. KM 26 site monitoring data. 
unit was firm and over-consolidated with pre-consolidation 
pressures of up to 200 kPa underlain by a 3 to 5-m thick soft, 
compressible, normally to lightly over-consolidated layer 
containing organics and peat inclusions.  The deepest part of 
the Holocene soil was firm and normally consolidated.  The 
Pleistocene unit classified as silty clay with sand or sandy silt 
partings was stiff and over-consolidated with 
pre-consolidation pressures of up to 300 kPa.  Groundwater 
was within 1.0 to 1.5 m of the original ground surface at the 
time of post-failure investigation.  The soil samples classified 
as CL according to ASTM D2487 (ASTM 2006).  The values 
of  for KM 18 site soils from UU tests and VSTs are 
plotted in Fig. 5b.  For plotting these data it was assumed that 
the deposits were completely consolidated under the stresses 
due to the old embankment, and that the degree of 
consolidation due to the newly constructed MSE wall that 
failed, the embankment behind the MSE walls and the 
stabilizing berm was 50 % over the top 2.5 m thickness of the 
native foundation soils.  The consolidation of the deeper 
native soil layers because of the new embankment was 
neglected.  The sensitivity of the soil layers were between 4 
and 7. 
us
The site was only instrumented before MSE wall 
reconstruction.  Earlier there was no instrumentation at KM 18 
site.  However, a brief chronology of initial construction is as 
follows.  Since the site is permanently waterlogged, a 1-m 
high earth embankment was constructed in mid January 2004 
about 1-m to the west of the MSE wall alignment for 
dewatering the area for construction.  Dewatering began in 
late January 2004, after which the site was stripped to a depth 
of about 500 mm.  A 500-mm thick compacted sand pad was 
placed on the stripped surface.  Where the base of the MSE 
wall was to be at an elevation lower than the original ground 
 Paper No. 8.06b   5
level, the original ground surface was excavated for 
accommodating a 500-mm thick compacted sand pad 
underneath the base of the MSE wall.  Sand filling 
commenced in early February 2004 and MSE wall 
construction began by the end of February 2004.  The MSE 
wall and the reinforced sand embankment behind it were about 
8 m high by mid June 2004 and 9.25 m by early February 
2005.  There was virtually no earthwork between mid June 
2004 and mid January 2005.  Earthwork began in end 
November 2005 and the embankment construction was 
complete in early December 2005.  The paving work was 
completed by mid January 2006 and the stretch was opened 
for vehicular traffic by mid January 2006. 
Data from the instruments installed after failure for monitoring 
the reconstruction activities, presented in Figure 7, indicate 
that the settlements were continuing to develop and pore water 
pressures were still dissipating after about 4.5 months of 
preload placement (completed in the first week of January 
2007) and PVD installation (completed in the third week of 
October 2006). 
 
Fig. 7. KM 18 site monitoring data. 
 
INITIAL EXTERNAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 
The failure patterns at KM 26 and KM 18 sites are indicative 
of deep seated failure due to external instability of foundation 
soils.  Consequently, internal designs of the MSE walls are not 
examined in this paper.  Design of the embankments was to be 
according to the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) document IRC: 
75 (IRC 1979).  This document calls for a limit equilibrium 
factor of safety against external failure of 1.25 and an 
allowable settlement of up to 600 mm.  Brief accounts on limit 
equilibrium stability analysis of KM 26 and KM 18 





KM 26 Embankment 
 
As indicated earlier, construction at KM 26 site began after 
installation of PVDs (Colbonddrain® CX1000) to 15 m depths 
on an average in square grid pattern at 1.5 m centers.  A 
mandrel of diamond-shaped cross section with diagonals 
nominally measuring 50 mm and 120 mm was used in PVD 
installation. 
 
Measurements from KM 26 site indicate that the undrained 
shear strength at this location can be expressed as a function of 
effective vertical stress shown with a solid line in Fig. 5a.  
Since, the undrained shear strength is a function of effective 
stress under which the deposit was in equilibrium, for 
estimating the shear strength at the time of failure the state of 
consolidation at that time needs to be assessed. 
At KM 26 site, the average degree of consolidation was 
obtained using daym 02.0 2=vhc ( : coefficient of 
consolidation for flow in the horizontal direction) and 
vhc
secm 101 10−×=hk  ( : horizontal hydraulic conductivity).  
These estimates are from the one dimensional consolidation 
tests performed in the laboratory and the assumptions that the 
ratio of vertical to horizontal coefficients of consolidation of 2 
and smear zone diameter to be 2.5 times the equivalent 
mandrel diameter applicable for massive deposits (Hansbo 
2004).  The results indicate that the average degree of 
consolidation for the foundation soils at the time of failure for 
the vertical pressure for embankment height of 3.5 m was 
100 % and that for the stage above 3.5 m that was constructed 
relatively rapidly between October 31, 2004 and the time of 
failure was about 50 %. 
hk
For the profile of peak undrained shear strength indicated with 
the solid line on Fig. 5a, the results of limit equilibrium 
stability computations for the MSE wall configuration at 
failure indicate that the structure was marginally stable at the 
time of failure according to the Generalized Limit Equilibrium 
(GLE) procedure (Chugh 1986) (Fig. 8).  Software package 
XSTABL Version 5.1 (Interactive Software Designs, Inc. 
1994) was used in all stability analysis of this study. 
 
Fig. 8. Undrained stability of KM 26 embankment at failure. 
In comparison, the minimum factor of safety against circular 
slip in the original design was under static loads was 1.15 in 
the slope stability analysis.  However, in the original design 
the maximum considered embankment height including 
pavement structure was 9 m against the actual maximum 
height of 9.8 m and a total unit weight of 15 kN/m3 (in stead 
of 18 to 19 kN/m3 representative of the compacted river sand 
used to construct the embankment) was assumed for the 
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embankment body because of the initial plan of constructing 
the embankment partly with fly ash.  Most importantly, the 
strength parameters used in the original design, shown on Fig. 
5a for comparison, were based on the assumption that when 
the embankment construction reached a height of 9 m, the 
average degree of consolidation for the soil layers underneath 
would be 90 % under the surcharge imposed by an 
embankment of 7.1 m height resulting in an undrained shear 
strength of 50 kPa minimum.  Such a degree of consolidation 
was not achieved because of rapid construction rate.  
Moreover, even if 90% consolidation was to be achieved, 
available test data from the site indicate that the undrained 
shear strength would only have increased to about 30 kPa, an 
estimate smaller than the value assumed in the original design.  
Thus the bases of the original design were, in general, 
unconservative.  Even with these inputs, the overall stability 
requirement of IRC (1979) of a limit equilibrium factor of 
safety of 1.25 was not fulfilled. 
KM 18 Embankment 
 
Data from KM 18 site indicate that (a) the undrained shear 
strengths at this location decreases westward and (b) the 
undrained shear strengths can be expressed as functions of 
effective vertical stress as shown with a solid and a dashed 
line on Fig. 5b. 
External undrained stability of the configuration of the MSE 
wall assessed using the simplified Bishop method (Bishop 
1955).  The input parameters used in the analysis were based 
on the assumptions that (a) the soil layers underneath the MSE 
wall were fully consolidated under the vertical stress imposed 
by the old embankment, (b) that the degree of consolidation 
due to the MSE wall and the newly constructed embankment 
was 50 %, and (c) the undrained shear strength profiles can be 
approximated with the solid and dashed lines of Fig. 5b.  The 
strength parameters for the old embankment were back figured 
from stability analysis to match the observed instance of deep 
seated rotational failure during the construction of the 
embankment in the sixties described earlier.  In the stability 
assessment of the old embankment, strength parameters for 
foundation soil were assumed in accordance with the dashed 
line of Fig. 5b.  The results of external stability assessment for 
the MSE wall at failure indicate that the MSE wall and the 
embankment behind it were indeed marginally stable at the 
time of failure (Fig. 9). 
 
Fig. 9. Undrained stability of KM 18 embankment at failure. 
In comparison, the minimum factor of safety against circular 
slip in the original design was under static loading was 1.42 in 
the slope stability assessment.  However, in the original design 
the maximum considered embankment height including 
pavement structure was 8.4 m against the actual maximum 
height of 10.5 m and a total unit weight of 15 kN/m3 was 
assumed for the embankment body because of the initial plan 
of constructing the embankment partly with fly ash.  Most 
importantly, the undrained shear strengths used in the original 
design, shown on Figure 5b for comparison, were over a large 
portion of the depth range of interest greater than those 
inferred from laboratory and in-situ test data.  Thus the bases 




Undrained Shear Strength 
 
The main factor contributing to the failures at KM 26 and KM 
18 sites appears to be the difficulty of estimating the post 
consolidation undrained shear strength of the soft foundation 
soils.  Examination of OCRs vu −′σ  data from KM26 and KM 
18 sites were found to be in reasonable agreement with the 
SHANSEP framework (Ladd et al., 1977) and relationship 
between vus σ ′  and OCR  could be approximated by 
( ) 76.025.0 OCRs vu ×=′σ  ( ). 80.02 =r
Trigger for External Stability 
 
It is apparent from the data and results presented in the 
previous section that the failures at KM 26 and KM 18 appears 
to be due to the use of inappropriately high shear strength, 
incorrect cross sectional geometry and unit weight of 
embankment material in the initial stability assessments.  Both 
the embankments were externally marginally stable at the time 
of failure. 
It is evident from available instrumentation records that the 
embankment at KM 26 site was undergoing rapid settlements 
over approximately 2.5 months prior to failure.  The 
construction rate was not controlled to allow settlement rates 
to decelerate.  As deformations increased the strain within the 
foundation soils beyond those at which the peak undrained 
shear strengths are mobilized.  This eventually led to failure. 
While the situation at KM 18 site also appears to be similar, 
no direct evidence of accelerated settlement rate immediately 
before failure is available because of the absence of 
instrumentation and monitoring of initial construction 
activities continuing through the early operational phase of the 
MSE wall and embankment.  However, available surveying 
records from the site at and immediately after indicates that 
the event was a progressive failure possibly triggered because 
of ongoing deformations of sensitive foundation soils due to 
inadequate factor of safety against external instability. 
Information obtained during post failure investigations and 
review earlier records from both sites before failure indicate 
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that both the failures could be avoided by undertaking 
adequate geotechnical investigation at the design stage and 





Design of Remedial Measures at KM 26 Site 
 
Reconstruction work at the KM 26 failure site included 
construction of a two-stepped, 5.2-m high stabilizing berm 
along the outer face of the MSE wall followed by the 
reconstruction of the MSE wall and the highway embankment.  
The overall berm width measured outward from the face of the 
reconstructed MSE wall to the toe of the lower bench was 
31.4-m. 
The minimum factor of safety under static loads against 
overall rotational failure for the MSE wall, embankment and 
stabilizing berm at the end of construction is estimated at 1.20 
(Fig. 10). 
 
Fig. 10. Undrained stability of remodeled KM 26 
embankment. 
Since berm construction was scheduled before MSE wall 
reconstruction, the shear strengths for the stability assessment 
were based on the assumption that the foundation soils within 
the PVD treated zone extending to a distance of 4 m outward 
from the MSE wall face would consolidate under the weight 
of the berm by the time the MSE wall reconstruction was 
complete.  As such, the factor of safety meets the 
recommendation of IRC (1979).  Furthermore, as the 
foundation soils underneath the berm consolidate, the factor of 
safety is expected to reach a value of 1.35 after about 5 years 
of berm construction. 
Reconstruction Activity at KM 26 Site 
 
The earthwork for berm construction was complete by mid 
April 2005.  The MSE wall and highway embankment 
construction was complete by mid June 2005.  The pavements 
construction was complete by July 2005 and the reconstructed 
highway interchange was reopened for vehicular traffic in 
November 2005.  Since then the earth structure appears to be 
performing satisfactorily. 
Design of Remedial Measures at KM 18 Site 
 
The remedial measures at the KM 18 site included installation 
of PVDs to a 13-m depth, construction of a two-stepped 
stabilizing berm along the outer face of the failed MSE wall, 
and reconstruction of the MSE wall and the highway 
embankment.  For a configuration shown in Figure 11, the 
minimum factor of safety against overall rotational failure for 
the MSE wall, embankment and stabilizing berm at the end of 
construction was estimated at 1.22.  For these assessments it 
was assumed that the consolidation of soils within the 
PVD-treated zone would be 75 % complete at end of 
construction and the effect of consolidation outside the 
PVD-treated zone was neglected.  Although the computed 
factor of safety at end of construction is slightly smaller than 
the recommendation of IRC (1979), in longer term the factor 
of safety is expected to reach 1.38 upon completion of 
consolidation of soils within the PVD-treated zone. 
 
Fig. 11. Undrained stability of remodeledKM 18 embankment. 
Reconstruction Activity at KM 18 Site 
 
PVDs (Colbonddrain® CX1000) were installed in October 
2006 at 1.2 m spacing in square grid pattern using a mandrel 
of diamond-shaped cross section with diagonals nominally 
measuring 50 mm and 120 mm was used in PVD installation.  
The PVD treatment covered an area of width of 19 m 
(measured outward from the face of the failed MSE wall) 
north of station 18.300 and 17 m south of station 18.300.  The 
stabilizing berm was constructed between October 2006 and 
February 2007.  The upper bench of the stabilizing berm was 
20 m wide and reached an elevation 3 m below the finished 
road level.  The maximum overall berm width measured from 
the base of the reconstructed MSE wall to the toe of the lower 
bench was 37 m.  Three standpipe piezometers and three 
settlement gages were installed through the stabilizing berm as 
discussed earlier.  After the removal of the failed embankment 
to an elevation approximately 5.75 m above the original 
ground surface, reconstruction work for the MSE wall and the 
highway embankment was taken up in February 2007.  Three 
standpipe piezometers and three settlement gages were 
installed within the footprint of mechanically stabilized earth 
wall after the removal of the failed embankment.  These 
installations were extended with the increasing elevation of 
the top of the constructed embankment.  Drilling, sampling 
and Standard Penetration Testing were carried out near the end 
of April 2007 to check whether the gain in undrained shear 
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strength due to accelerated consolidation of soft soils within 
the PVD-treated zone was as assumed in redesign.  These data 
indicate that the undrained shear strengths increased by 
between 25 % and 100 % following accelerated consolidation 
of the soils within the PVD-treated zone and for the most part 
exceeded those assumed in the overall stability assessment for 
embankment redesign.  As expected, the increases were most 
significant within the softer zones and relatively minor within 
firm to stiff layers. 
Embankment reconstruction above 8 m height was allowed 
from May 2007 after these data were reviewed and fill 
placement and paving work was completed by the beginning 
of June 2007.  The reconstructed highway embankment was 
reopened for vehicular traffic by mid-2007.  The earth 
structure appears to be performing satisfactorily since the 
reopening of the highway.  All the monitoring instruments at 
this site were in serviceable conditions throughout the 
reconstruction work and the initial operational phase of the 
structure.  Monitoring data from these installations during the 
reconstruction work and initial operational phase of the 





Case histories pertaining to highway embankment failure at 
two soft soil sites have been presented.  Both the sites are 
located within the floodplains and backswamps of river 
Hooghly, a distributary of the Ganges underlain by soft silty 
clay and clayey silt.  One of these sites, KM 18, remains 
waterlogged throughout the year, and the other, KM 26, also 
remains waterlogged over prolonged periods.  The MSE wall 
and the associated embankment at KM 26 site was constructed 
on ground improved by PVD installation followed by preload 
placement, while construction at KM 18 site was undertaken 
after dewatering the work site over unimproved ground. 
Geotechnical investigation and analytical work undertaken 
after the failures indicate that the KM 26 and KM 18 failure 
was caused by the following: 
• Rapid construction rate that did not allow consolidation of 
foundation soils needed for development of undrained 
shear strengths assumed in the initial design, and 
• Underestimation of driving force because of the use of 
smaller embankment heights and material unit weight in 
the overall stability assessment of the initial design.   
• The post-failure investigations at the KM 18 site 
indicated, on the other hand, that KM 18 failure was 
primarily caused by  
o Overestimation of undrained shear strength, and 
o Underestimation of driving force because of the use 
of smaller embankment heights and material unit 
weight in the overall stability assessment of the initial 
design.  
Both these incidents could be avoided by undertaking 
adequate geotechnical investigation at the design stage and 
appropriate coordination between the design office and 
construction activities. 
Extensive geotechnical investigations were completed at both 
failure sites after failure to investigate the causes of failures.  
Review of these data and available pre failure information 
indicate that the SHANSEP approach provides a reasonable 
guidance for estimating the undrained soil strengths of the soft 
foundation soils at these sites. 
The reconstruction at KM 26 site basically involved 
construction of a stabilizing berm along the outer face of the 
MSE wall.  The reconstruction at KM 18 site involved 
installation of PVDs along the outer margins of the MSE wall 
and preloading of the PVD-treated area and undertaking MSE 
wall and highway embankment reconstruction following 
adequate consolidation and strengthening of the soft soils 
within the PVD-treated zone.  Reconstruction activities at KM 
26 and KM 18 sites spanned approximately six months.  Both 
these structures have been carrying vehicular traffic over 
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